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Note
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group,
Inc.: Can Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts Survive a
"Fairness" Analysis?
by
RUSSELL EVANS*

Introduction
On June 30,1997, the California Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.' The Engalla
Court refused to compel arbitration of a medical malpractice claim
despite the presence of a binding arbitration clause in the terms of a
medical insurance agreement 2 The California Court indicated that
defendant malfeasance appeared likely, and it remanded the case to
the trial court for factual determinations on whether the defendant
HMO, Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, induced the arbitration
clause through fraud
or waived its right to arbitration due to its
3
dilatory conduct.
The holding and eventual outcome of this case, however, are
merely side issues for purposes of this Note. Rather, it is the Court's
intriguing examination and careful scrutiny of Kaiser's arbitration
process that raises key legal questions. Under the conventional
review of arbitration clauses, courts limit their analysis to issues of
creation and initial consent to such clauses. The Engalla Court,
however, did not limit itself to the formation of the arbitration
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 1999; B.A. University of California,
Berkeley, 1995.
1. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
2. See id. at 908.
3. 1& at 924.
[635]
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agreement. Instead, the Court conducted a sweeping examination
into how the Kaiser arbitration process functioned and considered
whether the process was an adequate system for resolving malpractice
claims. 4 Using this mode of analysis, the majority found numerous
flaws in Kaiser's arbitration process. The opinion is especially critical
of the ways in which the arbitration process infringed upon the
procedural rights of claimants. The Court's examination of the
arbitral process, rather than agreement formation, and its focus on
procedural deficiencies imply that minimum levels of "fairness" must
be present in the operation of all arbitration systems.
This expansion in the judicial examination of arbitration clauses
has important implications for employment law. Binding arbitration
clauses have exploded in usage and popularity since the United States
Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
5 Yet, the widespread use of such clauses has been
Corporation.
matched step-by-step with widespread criticism. Many commentators
assert that arbitration in the employment context is marred by6
procedural shortcomings, inappropriateness, and general unfairness.
The Engalla decision signals that the California Supreme Court has
also grown weary of binding arbitration. Engalla surely does not
herald the end of binding arbitration clauses in employment
contracts. Nevertheless, in the wake of this decision, employees have
a new point of attack in challenging arbitration clauses, while
employers have the impetus to amend their arbitration practices to
conform to the heightened requirements of a "fairness" standard.
Part I of this Note examines the Engalla decision in detail. Part
II considers whether Engalla is part of a growing trend of
dissatisfaction with arbitration in the non-commercial context or if
the impact of the decision will be limited to cases with similarly
distasteful facts. Part II will also consider whether Engallarepresents
a judicial reaction to the criticisms of employment dispute arbitration
and, if so, what effect this development will have on employment
contracts. Part III presents a case study of the securities industry and
its experience using arbitration for employment matters. Finally,
Parts IV and V suggest several courses of action in response to the
fairness issues raised by the Engalla decision.
I. The Engalla Decision
The Engalla case originated from a malpractice claim in which

4. See id at 909-14.
5. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
6. See infranotes 60-74 and accompanying text.
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Wilfredo Engalla asserted that Kaiser doctors negligently failed to
diagnose his lung cancer.7 Under the terms of Engalla's Service
Agreement (SA) with Kaiser, the malpractice claim was subject to
arbitration.8 The SA required claimants to serve Kaiser with an
arbitration claim and required each side to designate an arbitrator
within thirty days after service.9 The parties had an additional thirty
days to choose a neutral third arbitrator for the arbitration panel. 10 In
addition to these time requirements, the California Supreme Court
found two related factors relevant. First, the arbitration program
called for by the SA was designed, written, mandated, and
administered by Kaiser." No independent person or entity was
employed to provide administrative services, oversight, or evaluation
of the arbitration program and its performance. 12 Moreover, these
facts were not disclosed to members of Kaiser's health plan. 13
Second, Kaiser disseminated various publications
representing its
arbitration program as quick, efficient, and fair.14
In practice, the Kaiser arbitration program was cumbersome and
extremely slow. 15 An independent statistical analysis of data
provided by Kaiser revealed that medical malpractice arbitrations
were delayed in ninety-nine percent of the cases. 16 A neutral third
arbitrator was selected within the sixty-day SA time requirement in
only one percent of the cases and only three percent of the cases saw
a neutral arbitrator appointed within 180 days.' 7 The average time
taken in selecting a neutral third arbitrator was 674 days. 18 Even after
selection of the arbitrators, additional delays occurred as it took an
average of 863 days to reach a hearing under Kaiser's arbitration
program.' 9
In Wilfredo Engalla's case, Kaiser did not select its arbitrator
until forty-seven days after the original claim was served. 20 Despite
Mr. Engalla's deteriorating medical condition, Kaiser refused to begin

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See 938 P.2d at 909.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id
See id.
See id
See id at 910.
See id at 912-13.
See id at 912.
See id. at 912-13.
See id. at 913.
See id.
See id at 910.
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discovery until after the appointment of a neutral third arbitrator.21
However, Kaiser delayed the selection of the third arbitrator when it
failed to formally retain the agreed-upon arbitrator and then failed to
pay the deposit required for the arbitrator's services.22
As
administrator of the arbitration program, Kaiser was obligated to
perform both of these duties.23 The neutral arbitrator was finally
accepted by Kaiser 144 days after service of Mr. Engalla's claim, one
day before Mr. Engalia died.24
Claiming malpractice and fraud, Engaila's family and the
representatives of his estate sued Kaiser in Superior Court.2s The
trial court denied Kaiser's motion to compel arbitration based on
findings of fraud in the inducement and fraud in the application of the
arbitration agreement. 26 The California Court of Appeal reversed. 27
On subsequent appeal, however, the California Supreme Court
agreed with the trial court's finding that evidence of fraud existed to
support a denial of Kaiser's petition to compel arbitration. The Court
therefore remanded the case for factual determinations on the issues
of fraud and waiver.28
The first basis relied on by the California Supreme Court in
refusing to compel arbitration was fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause. 29 The Court began by interpreting section 1281.2
(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure to mean that petitions
to compel arbitration will not be granted when grounds exist for
rescinding the arbitration agreement.3 0 Fraud constitutes such
grounds. 31 In Engalla, the Court found facts to support the claim

"that Kaiser entered into the arbitration agreement with knowledge
that it would not comply with its own contractual timelines, or with at
least reckless indifference as to whether its agents would use
reasonable diligence and good faith to comply with them. ' 32 The

21. See id at 911.
22. See id at 912.
23. See id.
24. See id
25. See id at 914.
26. See id at 915.
27. See id
28. See id at 908.
29. See id. at 922.
30. See 938 P.2d at 916 (interpreting CAL. CODE. CIV. PROC. §1281.2 (West 1997)).
"[T]he court shall order the petitioner and respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it
determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:
(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist
for the revocation of the agreement." Id
31. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1689(b)(1) (West 1997).
32. 938 P.2d at 917.
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Court recognized that Kaiser was not strictly bound to a sixty day
requirement since selecting the neutral third arbitrator was a bilateral
decision dependent on agreement of both parties.3 3 Nevertheless,
Kaiser's contractual representations "at the very least commit[ted it]
to exercise good faith and reasonable diligence" in meeting its
established timelines.34 This was especially true considering Kaiser
contractually assumed responsibility for administering the arbitration
program 5 Therefore, the Court held that Kaiser's misrepresentations
regarding the timeliness of its arbitration program, its knowledge of
these falsities, Mr. Engalla's reliance upon the falsities, and his
a claim of fraud in the
subsequent damage were sufficient to support
36
inducement of the SA arbitration clause.
The Court then considered whether Kaiser's dilatory conduct
constituted waiver of its right to compel arbitration. 37 Section 1281.2
(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that a petition
to compel arbitration shall be refused if the "right to compel has been
waived by the petitioner. '38 A variety of actions may constitute
waiver, including unreasonable delay, bad faith, or willful
misconduct.3 9 According to the Engalla Court, delay must be
substantial, unreasonable, and in spite of the claimant's own
reasonable diligence. 40 The Court concluded that "Kaiser's course of
delay,.., which was arguably unreasonable or undertaken in bad
faith, may provide sufficient grounds for a trier of fact'41to conclude
that Kaiser has in fact waived its arbitration agreement."
Finally, the Engalla Court examined Kaiser's arbitration clause
for unconscionability, but it ultimately rejected this challenge. 42
Under California case law, "contractual arrangements for the nonjudicial resolution of disputes 'must possess' minimum levels of
integrity." 43 The Engalla Court cautioned that "HMO's are...
especially obligated not to impose contracts on their subscribers that
are one-sided and lacking in fundamental fairness." 44 Nonetheless, it
held that Kaiser's arbitration agreement did not, on its face, lack
33. See id.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
See id
See id. at 922.
See 938 P.2d at 922-24.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1997).
See Engalla, 938 P.2d at 923.
See id. at 924.
Id.
Id at 924-25.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc,. 623 P.2d 165,176 (Cal. 1981)).
Id.
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minimum levels of integrity and was thus not per se unconscionable. 45
The Court objected to the discrepancy between Kaiser's
actual workings of the program, not the
representations and the
46
arbitration clause itself.
The rejection of Wilfredo Engalla's unconscionability claim
presents an important limit to the decision. The Court was unwilling
to find that Kaiser's arbitration clause was unfair on its face. Yet, in
its analysis of Mr. Engalla's fraud and waiver claims, the Court's
conclusions were induced by the unfair operation of Kaiser's
arbitration program. The Court apparently reached a line it was
unwilling to cross and instead drew a distinction between the general
fairness of arbitration and the fairness of particular arbitration
programs. Thus, arbitration remains a legitimate alternative to
judicial resolution, even in the non-commercial context, but only if
the arbitration process satisfies an unspecified level of fairness. As
Justice Mosk wrote for the majority: "[A]lthough we affirm the basic
policy in favor of... arbitration agreements, the governing statutes
place limits on the extent to which a party that has committed
misfeasance in the performance of such an agreement may compel its
enforcement." 47
The Engalla decision is exceptional because it expressed a
unique, expansive mode of analyzing arbitration clauses. The Court
validated Engalla's fraud and waiver claims only after an extensive
review of the operation of Kaiser's arbitration system. 48 Not only did
the Court look to Mr. Engalla's experience with the program, but it
also considered how the program performed in the past.49 The
fundamental problem with Kaiser's arbitration program was that
systematic delays evinced a patently unfair arbitration process. The
Engalla Court extended its scrutiny of arbitration beyond an analysis
of the creation and inducement of an arbitration clause to a broad
examination of Kaiser's entire arbitration process.
Justice Kennard, in concurrence, summed up the rationale
behind the majority's scrutiny: "[T]his case illustrates yet again the
essential role of the courts in ensuring that the arbitration system
delivers not only speed and economy but also fundamental
faimess. ' '50 Justice Kennard further explained how "[p]rocedural
manipulations can be used by a party not only to delay and obstruct
45. See id. at 925.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See idL
Id at 908.
See iLat 908-14.
See id at 912-13.
Id.at 925 (Kennard, J., concurring).
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the proceedings, thereby denying the other party the speed and
efficiency that are the arbitration system's primary justification, but
also to affect the possible outcome of the arbitration."' Moreover,
the concurrence pointed out that unfairness in arbitration is a special
risk outside of the commercial context because consumer banking
terms, health insurance agreements, or employment contracts
resemble adhesion contracts between parties of unequal bargaining
power in which the institutional party can demand the arbitration
Although Justice Kennard's
process of its own choosing.52
observations were not explicitly expressed in the majority opinion,
the majority's careful scrutiny of Kaiser's arbitration process implies
that it was motivated by similar concerns.
Justice Brown's dissenting opinion, however, strongly protested
this new approach. According to the dissent, misfeasance in the
arbitration process should first be resolved in arbitration.53 Only after
an arbitrator finds a specific arbitration clause unenforceable should
the parties be permitted to seek relief from the courts.54 The
majority's approach to binding arbitration clauses, with its careful
scrutiny of the fairness of the arbitration process, prompted a warning
from the dissent: "However well-intentioned the majority and
however deserving its intended target, today's holding pokes a hole in
the barrier separating private arbitrations and the courts.
any such breach, this hole will eventually cause
Unfortunately, like
55
the dam to burst.1
Does Engalla represent a growing trend for judicial review of
arbitration clauses or merely an anomaly generated by unique facts?
To answer this question, the factors that influenced the concurrence's
misgivings regarding arbitration in the consumer and employment
context must be examined alongside the precedent which motivated
the dissent's reverence for a separate arbitral forum.
H. Is Engalla a Trendsetter or an Anomaly in the Employment
Context?
Although the Engalla case involved mandatory arbitration in the
medical malpractice context, the Court's "fairness" scrutiny could
have an important impact in the field of employment law. Scrutiny of
arbitration procedures for "fairness" is a particularly ominous

51. IL at 926 (Kennard, J., concurring).
52. See id at 926-27.

53. See id at 928.
54. See id at 930-31.
55. Id at 932 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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development for employment law in light of the exploding use of
56
binding arbitration clauses in non-union employment contracts.
Eager to enjoy the purported advantages of arbitration 57 and avoid

the uncertainties of a jury trial, employers are including arbitration8
clauses in standard employment contracts with increasing frequency
This growing practice, however, has not been universally
endorsed by the legal community. Commentators have vigilantly
examined the shortcomings of mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes.5 9 The Engalla decision itself may represent the acceptance
of the scholarly criticism which argues that the problems associated
with arbitrating employment disputes can only be countervailed by
requiring stricter procedural safeguards for the arbitration of such
claims. If this is a valid interpretation of Engalla, the most important
question arising from the case is whether the Court's "fairness"

analysis represents part of a growing judicial trend or merely an
aberration produced from the egregious facts of a particular case.
The following section examines the claimed deficiencies of arbitration

for employment disputes and analyzes whether courts will
increasingly probe arbitration processes or continue to apply
traditional standards of arbitration review.
In the years following the United States Supreme Court's 1991
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corporation,60the use

56. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice:A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 1187,1188 & n.5 (1993).
57. In theory, arbitration advantages include speed and efficiency, lower cost, privacy,
and finality. Also, "arbitrators are less likely than juries to award excessive damage
awards." Michele M. Buse, Comment, ContractingEmployment Disputes Out of the Jury
System: An Analysis of the Implementation of Binding Arbitration in the Non-union
Workplace and Proposals to Reduce the Harsh Effects of a Non-appealable Award, 22
PEPP. L. REV. 1485,1496-99 (1995).
58. However, a survey of the use of mandatory arbitration suggests that the early
enthusiasm for arbitration policies that was produced by the Gilmer decision may be
slowing as the questions left unanswered by Gilmer become more evident and produce
greater uncertainty. Some of the employers questioned in the survey indicated they
expected to implement an arbitration policy, but were awaiting further judicial definition
of the types of plans that would withstand legal scrutiny before going forward with their
own policies. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration,52 JAN
DISP. RESOL. J. 8,78 (January 1997).
59. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
60. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The narrow holding of Gilmer was that an agreement to
arbitrate contained in a securities exchange registration form will be enforced with respect
to claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Nonetheless, by reasoning
that arbitration is appropriate where a statute does not expressly preclude waiver of
statutory rights (such as the right to a court trial) Gilmer provided the foundation for
lower federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements with respect to employment claims
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of arbitration clauses in employment contracts has steadily increased.
At the same time, critics have been equally steadfast in observing and
commenting on the substantive problems posed by the arbitration of
employment disputes. 61 Several commentators have also considered
the procedural issues raised by employment dispute arbitration. 62 In
particular, commentators have noted that widespread judicial
approval of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts
may require courts to police the arbitration systems which are
instituted by such clauses.6 3 Meanwhile, a common criticism of
employment dispute arbitration involves the arbitrators themselves.
Many employment arbitration clauses call for an arbitration system in
which the arbitrators are unfamiliar with and inexperienced in
employment law.64
This is particularly troublesome in the
employment context since arbitrators are often called upon to
interpret and expound discrimination statutes that were enacted to
protect the public. 65 Moreover, in contrast to the equal opportunity
goals of most employment statutes, some employment arbitration
panels are dominated by older white males.66 This stands in stark
contrast to statutory safeguards which assure fairness and diversity in
selecting petit jurors for federal trials; federal juries are intended to
represent a broad cross-section of the community and, thus, potential
jurors cannot be excluded due to race, color, religion, sex, national

under Title VII, the ADA and other statutes; some courts have declined to do so, but the
majority have expanded the Gilmer rationale to various statutes. See Martin H. Malin,
ArbitratingStatutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.
77, 92 (1996).
61. In particular, controversy surrounds whether or not it is appropriate for private
arbitrators to decide issues of public law outside of the collective bargaining context. See
Malin, supra note 60, at 99-102; Buse, supra note 57, at 1512-13. This controversy,
however, exceeds the scope of this Note.
62. See, e.g., Malin, supranote 60, at 95-99.
63. See id.
64. See HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
How REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 11 (1994) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]; Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and PracticalImplications of ADR andArbitration in
Employment Disputes, 11 HOFST'RA LAB. L. 247, 265 (1993); Megan L. Dunphy,
Comment, Mandatory Arbitration: Stripping Securities Industry Employees of their Civil
Rights, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169,1210-11 (1995).
65. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (West 1997).
66. The 1994 GAO report found that in December 1992 the New York Stock
Exchange's arbitrator pool was 89% male, 97% white, and was an average age of 60;
NASD officials predicted that their arbitrator pool generally resembled that of the NYSE.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 64, at 8.
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origin, or economic status. 67 The securities industry provides a useful
example of these concerns and its experience with arbitrating
employment disputes will be discussed in detail in Part III.
Another claimed deficiency of employment arbitration relates to
the selection procedures instituted by some arbitration policies.
Some systems give the employer sole power to choose the
arbitrator. 68 Meanwhile, even where joint selection by the employer
and the employee is provided, individual employees may be put at a
disadvantage by a lack of familiarity with and information about the
eligible arbitrators relative to the knowledge possessed by
employers. 69 Also, the employer's continuous use of arbitration risks
creating an institutional bias whereby an arbitrator who desires future
work will be hesitant to render a decision that is contrary to the
employer's expectations. 70 Various other procedural criticisms have
been cited as proof of the flawed nature of employment dispute
arbitration, including: charging of arbitration costs and fees to
claimants; 71 limited discovery permitted in arbitration proceedings; 72
lack of written opinions;73 and insufficient judicial review of
arbitration decisions.74 Despite these criticisms, courts have been
reluctant to address the claimed shortcomings of arbitration
procedures. In both the employment and non-employment contexts,
the vast majority of courts have avoided scrutinizing the "fairness" of
an arbitration process.
Nonetheless, several courts have taken a careful look at the
appropriateness of specific arbitration procedures. For instance, in
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. River
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic,75 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas ordered a preliminary injunction
preventing the operation of a mandatory arbitration program.76 The
67. See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment DiscriminationClaims: Do You
Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 276 (1994) (citing 28

U.S.C. §§ 1861-1863; 18 U.S.C. §243).
68. See Bickner et al., supra note 58, at 80; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 43-44 (1996).

69. See Bickner et al., supra note 58, at 11; Grodin, supra note 68, at 43-44.
70. See Bickner et al., supra note 58; Grodin, supranote 68, at 43-44.
71. See Grodin, supra note 68, at 44-45.
72. See Ellwood F. Oakley, III & Donald 0. Mayer, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary Federalism,47 S.C. L. REV.

475, 533 (1996); Buse, supra note 57, at 1521-22, 1534-35.
73. See Oakley & Mayer, supra note 72, at 533-34; Buse, supra note 57, at 1537.
74. See Malin, supra note 60, at 102-03; Buse, supra note 57, at 1537-38.
75. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (River Oaks).
76. See id.
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defendant in the case, River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic ("ROID"),
instituted an "ADR Policy" which required the arbitration of all

employment controversies. 77 Chief Judge Black found ROID's policy
"so misleading and against the principles of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that its use violate[d] such law."7 8 Judge Black
cited several flaws in the arbitration program as grounds for his

decision: the program required complaining employees to pay half the
costs of any ADR proceedings as well as employer attorney's fees if
the employer prevailed; the filing requirements interfered with an
employee's rights to file complaints with the EEOC; and the
implementation of the policy, whereby employees who refused to

agree with the new policy risked termination, possibly constituted
retaliation2 9 The case was ultimately decided by a consent order
which permanently revoked ROID's ADR policy.80

This case is

significant in that the court did not blindly uphold the challenged
arbitration program. Rather, the Court scrutinized the policy and
enjoined it on the basis of the unfair provisions it contained.81
A federal district court in Boston embarked on an even more
ambitious examination of arbitration procedures. In Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch,82 a sex discrimination suit brought by a securities
employee, the defendant sought a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the mandatory arbitration clause found in the employee's

securities dealer registration form.83 The district judge initially
deferred a decision on the motion and ordered the parties to submit
information on whether the securities industry's mandatory
arbitration system adequately protects the rights of workers who
make discrimination claims.84 In support of her order, Judge Gertner
explained that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer
had left "open the possibility that some arbitration procedures could

be systematically challenged as biased. '85 The plaintiffs argument

77. See Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration;Alternative Dispute Resolution or
CoerciveDispute Suppression?,17 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 131,136 (1996).
78. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1243.
79. See id.; see also Hoffman, supra note 77, at 136-40.
80. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. River Oaks Imaging &
Diagnostic, No. H-94-755 (S.D. Tex. June 23, 1995).
81. See Hoffman, supra note 77, at 140.
82. 965 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1997) (Rosenberg I).
83. See id. at 191.
84. See id, at 192. The order also called for briefings on issues that are beyond the
scope of this Note: the applicability of Gilmer to Title VII in light of that statute's 1991
amendments; the applicability of Gilmer to the ADEA in light of that statute's 1990
amendments; and the legal standard for an employee's waiver of rights to an Article III
judge and representative jury. See id. at 203.
85. Id. at 201. See infra text accompanying notes 134-41.
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that her "arbitration panel may be biased or inappropriately selected
[was], at least on the surface," found to have some merit, but the
record was insufficient to make a final determination. 86 Therefore,
Judge Gertner ordered discovery regarding plaintiffs signing of her
securities registration form and the adequacy of the arbitration
process desired by the defendant.87 After submissions by both
parties, the district court found that the NYSE arbitration system was
"inadequate to vindicate Rosenberg's [statutory] rights." 88 According
to the court, "Rosenberg ha[d] risen to the Supreme Court's
challenge" and demonstrated that "structural bias" in the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) procedures made the system inadequate for
the fair adjudication of her claims.89 This conclusion was based on
two findings. First, the court found that Merrill Lynch was a member
firm of the NYSE, and that the NYSE's member firms "govern the
[NYSE] as part of [its] self-regulating scheme." 9 Second, the court
found that "[f]rom the rules that govern arbitration procedure,
through the selection of the arbitrators, to the details of discovery
practice, the system is dominated by the NYSE itself."91 The district
court concluded that "[d]ominace of an arbitral system by one side in
the dispute does not comport with any model of arbitral impartiality,"
regardless of the "competence or fairness of individual arbitrators
who participate [in] the NYSE system." 92 In addition to these
procedural problems, the court found Rosenberg's arbitration clause
statutes. 93
discrimination
under
applicable
unenforceable
Consequently, the court refused to compel arbitration of Rosenberg's
employment claims.94
86. Rosenberg I, 965 F. Supp. at 201.
87. See id- at 203.
88. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 212
(D. Mass. 1998) (RosenbergII).

89. See id- at 203, 206-07.
90. Id. at 207 (internal quotations omitted).
91. Id. at 210.
92. Id. at 211.
93. See id. at 204-06. The court held that the 1991 Amendments to Title VII (the Civil
Rights Act of 1991) as well as the Older Workers Protection Act amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act precluded the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements
to arbitration claims under these statutes. See id. This conclusion was overruled by the
First Circuit on appeal. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 163
F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1998) (Rosenberg III). But see Duffield v. Robertson Stevens & Co.,
144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 establishes
Congress' intention to preclude the enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate Title VII claims).
94. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190,
204-06 (D. Mass. 1998) (Rosenberg II).
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On appeal, however, the above findings of the Massachusetts
district court were overturned because there was no conclusive
evidence of actual bias in the NYSE arbitration system. 95 The First
Circuit explained that the lower court misinterpreted the structure of
the NYSE's system. Rather than being controlled by member firms
like Merrill Lynch, the court found that the NYSE itself plays a
significant role in monitoring and disciplining members for noncompliance with its rules.9 6 The court also found errors in the lower
court's description of the NYSE system's specific arbitration
procedures. 97 The selection process for choosing NYSE arbitrators
did not undermine employee rights and, since employees were not
asked to bear fees for the arbitration of their claims, cost
considerations did not impede employee claims. 98 Accordingly, the
court concluded that "the evidence establishe[d] no basis to invalidate
the NYSE arbitral scheme." 99 Once again, the actual outcome of the
Rosenberg litigation is of only minor importance to this Note. As
with Engalla, the significance of Rosenberg is that both the district
and appellate court engaged in a careful examination of a particular
arbitration process.
Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates'° presents
another employment case in which a court's holding was based on the
procedural flaws of a particular arbitration system. In this decision, a
California appellate court held that an employer's mandatory
complaint review system, and the procedures it operated under, were
unacceptably biased in favor of the employer hotel.1 1 The
procedures did not involve a third party decision maker. Instead,
Hotel managers had final authority in deciding disputes brought
before the review committee. 10 Likewise, the calling of witnesses and
presentation of evidence was subject to the discretion of Hotel
managers. 103
Meanwhile, the Employee Guide provided to
employees explicitly discouraged the use of attorneys in the dispute
proceedings. 104 According to the court, the dispute resolution system
"totally lack[ed] impartiality.' 10 5 Given its "strong view that a third
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Rosenberg M1, 163 F.3d at 66-67.
See i. at 67.
See id.at 66-68.
See id.
lId at 68.
50 Cal. App. 4th 676 (1996).
See id.at 692-93.
See id.at 680, 688.
See id.
See i.
Id at 692-93.
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party decision maker and some degree of impartiality must exist for a
dispute resolution mechanism to constitute arbitration," the court
concluded that this system failed to constitute a valid arbitration
system. 06 Procedural defects once again provided the grounds for a
court's rejection of an "unfair" arbitration arrangement.
Careful scrutiny of arbitration has also been employed in the
consumer arbitration context. In Patterson v. ITT Consumer
Financial Corp.," 7 a California appellate court closely examined
arbitration procedures and invalidated an arbitration clause on
grounds of unconscionability108 Patterson involved a "guaranteed
loan" financing document with a mandatory arbitration clause.
According to the court, the clause established confusing arbitration
procedures which created significant obstacles to a participatory
hearing.109 First, the location of the arbitration was unclear because
neither the agreement itself nor the rules of the administering
arbitration agency, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), specified
whether arbitration would be held in California, where the documents
were signed, or in Minnesota, where the NAF was located." 0
Moreover, borrowers would remain uninformed of the location until
after a claim was filed and a response entered."' Second, the
112
arbitration clause acted to limit a borrower's rights to a hearing.
For example, borrowers had to prepay substantial fees in order to
initiate a hearing and additional fees were required for discovery,
written findings, and expedited hearings." 3 "The likely effect of these
procedures," wrote the court, "is to deny a borrower against whom a
claim has been brought any opportunity to a hearing, much less a
hearing held where the contract was signed, unless the borrower has
considerable legal expertise or the money to hire a lawyer and/or
prepay substantial hearing fees.""n 4 The court concluded that such
procedures "become oppressive when applied to unsophisticated
borrowers of limited means in disputes over small claims" and
therefore refused to enforce the arbitration clause."15
Meanwhile, some courts have inquired into arbitration
procedures in the traditional domain of arbitration-commercial
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id at 687, 692.
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
See id. at 567.
See iL at 566-67.
See idL at 566.
See id.
See id
See id- at 566 n.3.
1& at566.
Id. at 567.
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11 6
disputes. In Graham v. Scissor-Tail,
the California Supreme Court
refused to enforce an arbitration provision in which the arbitrator was
unilaterally designated by one party." 7 The Court found the contract
to be one of adhesion and explained that an adhesion contract (or
provision) will not be enforced against the adhering party if it does
not fall within the reasonable expectations of that party." 8 Even if it
meets the reasonable expectations test, a provision will not be
enforced if it is unduly oppressive or unconscionable." 9 The Court
concluded that the provision at issue failed the second test "because it
designate[d] an arbitrator who, by reason of its status and identity,
[was] presumptively biased in favor of one party ... -"120 In such
circumstances, the contract "must be scrutinized with particular care
to insure that the party of lesser bargaining power... is not left in a
position depriving him of any realistic and fair opportunity to prevail
in a dispute under its terms.' 121 Moreover, "[w]hen it can be
demonstrated... that the clear effect of the established procedure of
the arbitrator will be to deny the resisting party a fair opportunity to
present his position, the court should refuse to compel arbitration."' 122
123 the Ninth
Likewise, in Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co.,
Circuit refused to compel arbitration based on several restrictions
that were placed on the arbitration process. 124 The agreement
established a shorter period of limitations than the applicable statute,
the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, and precluded the exemplary
damages and attorney's fees authorized by that law. 12 The court
characterized these provisions as an integrated scheme to circumvent
126
public policy and held the entire arbitration clause invalid.
In addition to the above cases, the very decision which
legitimized the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment

116. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
117. See Grodin, supra note 68, at 21-22.
118. See Scissor-Tail,623 P.2d at 172-73.
119. See id.
120. Id.at 173.
121. Id at 176.
122. Id.at 176-77.
123. 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Grodin, supra note 68, at 41-42; Lucille M.
Ponte, In the Shadow of Gilmer: How Post-Gilmer Legal Challenges to Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements Point the Way Towards Greater Fairness in Employment
Arbitration,12 OHio ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 359,378-79 (1997).
124. See Arco Products,43 F.3d at 1246-47.
125. See id.
at 1247-48.
126. See id. at 1249. Nonetheless, some courts have compelled arbitration of
employment discrimination claims despite restrictions on damages, attorney's fees, and
filing periods. See DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 1996 WL 4426 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Johnson v. Hubbard Board, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996).
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agreements, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., implied that
fairness of process may be required for the enforcement of noncommercial arbitration decisions.1 27 The plaintiff in this case signed
an employment agreement which required the arbitration of any
employment disputes. 12s
The agreement also provided that
arbitration would be conducted in accordance with the procedures
and rules of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") arbitration
system. 2 9 In his appeal, Gilmer challenged the adequacy the NYSE
arbitration procedures.1 30 He asserted that arbitration panels would
be biased and that arbitration discovery was too limited.' 3' Gilmer
also claimed that the lack of written opinions and the limited review
of arbitration decisions would impede the purposes of
antidiscrimination statutes and stifle the development of employment
law. 32 Furthermore, Gilmer contended that the unequal bargaining
power of employers and employees undermined the legitimacy of
arbitration decisions.1 33 The United States Supreme Court, however,
rejected each of these claims. First, the Court noted that Gilmer's
"generalized attacks on arbitration 'rest on suspicion of arbitration as
a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive
law to would-be complainants,' and as such, they are 'far out of step
with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring
this method of resolving disputes." '134 The Court then countered
Gilmer's claims with examples of how the NYSE arbitration rules and
procedures, which applied to the employment dispute at issue in the
case, afforded sufficient safeguards to ensure Gilmer a fair
opportunity to present his claims. 135

127. 500 U.S. 20.
128. See id
129. See id at 30-33.
130. See id.
131. See id.
at 30-31.
132. See id. at 32.
133. See id. at 32-33.
134. Id- at 30 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Sherson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477,481 (1989)).
135. In regards to arbitrator bias, the Court noted that the NYSE rules required that
parties be informed of the employment histories of arbitrators, that they be allowed to
make further inquires into arbitrator backgrounds, and that each party had one
peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. Also, the rules required
arbitrators to disclose any circumstances that might preclude their objectivity and
impartiality. The NYSE rules also provided for detailed written opinions which would be
available to the public and, since the rules did not restrict collective proceeding or the
types of relief which could be awarded, they were consistent with statutory purposes.
Finally, the Court explained that mere inequity of bargaining power did not render
arbitration unenforceable in the employment context. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33.
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Nonetheless, by intricately detailing the features of an acceptable
arbitration system, the United States Supreme Court implicitly
suggested that arbitration processes that do not contain similar
guarantees of fairness may be vulnerable to challenges in future
cases. 136 The Court reminded lower courts to "remain attuned to
well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from
the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would
provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract."'1 37 Moreover,

the decision did not reject the suggestion that a minimum level of
fairness is required for employment arbitration. Instead, the Court
concluded its procedural analysis by noting that, "[a]s with the
claimed procedural inadequacies discussed above, [a] claim of
unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific
38
cases. 1

The Engalla decision presents the sort of case-specific analysis of
arbitration procedures that was alluded to in Gilmer. After a careful
examination of the procedures established by Kaiser's arbitration
clause, the California Court found the system to be so unfair that it
amounted to fraud in inducing enrollees to agree to such a process as
well as waiver of any right to arbitration that Kaiser may have
originally possessed. 139 As detailed above, decisions from Texas,
Massachusetts, and California suggest that the procedural-fairness
approach of Engalla can also be applied to arbitration systems that
are used to resolve employment disputes.' ° In combination with the
Engalla decision, these cases reveal an evolving standard of
heightened procedural scrutiny for arbitration in the employment
context.
Nevertheless, the procedural analysis in Gilmer was only a small
part of that decision. As explained above, it did not alter the Court's
ultimate support for arbitration. Instead, the Court's narrow holding
focused on the enforceability of arbitration decisions: the Court held
that an agreement to arbitrate will be enforced with respect to claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because Congress
did not explicitly express, through either the text or legislative history
of the Act, any intent to preclude arbitration of such claims.14'
136. See Hoffman, supra note 77, at 154.
137. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614,627 (1985)).
138. 1&
139. See Engalla,938 P.2d at 922, 924.
140. See supra notes 72,75 and accompanying text.
141. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. "[Hjaving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Id at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
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Most courts similarly limit their review of arbitration issues to
two narrow subjects: (1) the arbitrability of the dispute in question
(for example, whether or not a statutory discrimination claim can be
subject to arbitration) and (2) the enforcement of particular
arbitration decisions. 142 The procedural aspects of arbitration
arrangements are usually ignored in such decisions. This approach is
consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") which contains
minimal procedural safeguards. The FAA provides that arbitration
awards will be vacated only where procured by fraud or corruption,
for evident partiality in the arbitrator, or for arbitral misconduct in
refusing to postpone a hearing upon sufficient cause or other
misbehavior prejudicial to a party's rights. 143 In addition, courts will
invalidate an arbitration award if the decision amounts to a manifest
disregard for the law.144 This principle is a narrow one. A manifest
disregard for the law is shown only if "the majority of arbitrators
deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law in order to
reach the result they did." 145
Courts that restrict the review of arbitration to issues of
enforcement and arbitrability are simply adhering to the broad
deference to arbitration that was explicitly ordered by the United
States Supreme Court in the "Steelworkers Trilogy."' 46 Likewise, the
California Supreme Court mandates a high level of deference to
arbitration. In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,147 the California Court
went so far as to hold that a binding arbitration award is not
appealable even when the decision is based on erroneous fact or
law. 148 The rationale behind strict judicial respect for arbitration
agreements and awards is the notion that if parties agree to arbitrate
a particular dispute, then an arbitrator's decision was intended to
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985)).
142. See Malin,supra note 60, at 83.
143. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (West 1997).
144. See, e.g., Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir.
1992); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991); Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1990). See also Malin, supra note 60, at 102 n.120
(citing various circuit courts' use of the manifest disregard standard).
145. Hughes, 975 F.3d at 1267. In 1995, the United States Supreme Court expressly
adopted the manifest disregard standard for review of the merits of an arbitral decisions.
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, -, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923-24
(1995).
146. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car, Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
147. 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
148. See id at 915-16. See also Buse, supra note 57, at 1501 & nn.105-09, for a detailed
discussion of the case.
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resolve the dispute. Accordingly, courts should not interfere with the
parties' original intent.
Nevertheless, arbitration decisions are overturned in limited
circumstances. For example, California's arbitration statute, section
1281.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides that an agreement to
arbitrate is unenforceable if "[g]rounds exist for the revocation of the
agreement.' 1 49 Similarly, the FAA provides that an arbitration award
is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
150
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract "
Therefore, the Engalla court, and like-minded courts around the
country, can avoid traditional modes of arbitral deference by
concluding that flaws in the arbitration process rise to such an
objectionable level that the initial agreement to arbitrate is subject to
revocation. That is, where procedural unfairness is successfully
linked to claims of fraud, waiver, or unconscionability, as alleged in
Engalla, traditional deference to arbitration and the usual
presumption of arbitrability may be overcome.
The fact that this approach may be used by courts does not mean
it ought to become a common mode of analysis. The particular facts
of the Engalla case may conceal the troublesome repercussions that
would derive from a "fairness" approach to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. In Engalla, Kaiser drastically failed to
implement its arbitration promises and, due to its systematic delays,
Mr. Engalla died before having the opportunity to present his
claims.' 5 ' Kaiser's arbitration system may have been so egregious
that it produced one of those dreaded opinions in which bad facts
made bad law. Arguably, heightened scrutiny for procedural
"fairness" is inappropriate for arbitration review. First, the concept
of "fairness" is open-ended and highly elusive. How can courts
adequately explain what differentiates a "fair" arbitration system
from an "unfair" one, such that future parties can structure
arbitration agreements in a non-offensive manner? A second
problem concerns the contractual nature of arbitration. The parties
agreed to a specific arbitration process. Why not hold them to their
bargain as long as their consent satisfies traditional contract
requirements? Furthermore, should review of fraud or waiver claims
be limited to the circumstances surrounding the formation of an
arbitration agreement or should review be extended to the actual
operation of the arbitration process? Past arbitration cases favor the
former approach. In those cases, review was generally limited to
149. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1281.2(b) (West 1997).
150. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (West 1997).
151. See Engalla,938 P.2d at 912.
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inspecting for any inappropriate inducement of the arbitration
agreement. 152 Finally, by associating fraud with "unfair" arbitration
procedures, the Engalla decision threatens to undercut arbitration as
a courtroom alternative. Under an extreme application of the
Engalla analysis, whenever a court is convinced that an arbitration
system contains some measure of "unfairness," the agreement to
arbitrate is subject to nonenforcement because of fraud, waiver,
unconscionability, or some other contract doctrine.
Such an
approach, as Justice Brown warned in her dissent, threatens to burst
open the dam and nullify arbitration as a mode of dispute
153
resolution.
Any threat posed by Engalla, however, depends on whether the
decision represents an anomaly or the start of a judicial trend.
Unfortunately, it is too early to make this determination. Yet, in the
shadow of Engalla and similar cases, employers and employees are
now on notice that some courts will be critical of arbitration
procedures. At the very least, the Engalla decision represents a
warning to employers. If an employer wants to arbitrate workplace
disputes it should ensure that its arbitration system satisfies a
minimum level of procedural fairness. To do otherwise risks nonenforcement of the arbitration clause and a loss of arbitration's
desired advantages.
HI. Case Study: The Securities Industry
The arbitration experience of the securities industry exhibits the
successes and deficiencies of using mandatory arbitration for
employment disputes. As a condition of employment in the securities
industry, all securities dealers are required to file a registration and
disclosure agreement known as a U-4.154 This registration form
contains a mandatory arbitration clause requiring securities
employees to arbitrate all employment disputes. 55 The resulting
arbitration programs are administered by self-regulating
organizations (SROs), such as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) or the National Associations of Securities Dealers (NASD),
156
and must be approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Although individual organizations such as the NASD can uniquely
152. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
arbitration must be knowingly accepted by an employee); see also, Howard, supra note 67,
at 266-69.
153. See Engalla,938 P.2d at 932.
154. See GAO REPORT, supra note 64, at 4.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 5.
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tailor their arbitration procedures, most securities organizations
model their arbitration systems on the Uniform Code of Arbitration
that was developed by the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration in 1977.157
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court's Gilmer
decision found this type of arbitration agreement binding for ADEA
claims and expressly sanctioned the arbitration procedures used by

the NYSE.158 Several lower courts have extended the Gilmer decision

and require securities employees to arbitrate a variety of other
statutory employment claims. 159 Through these decisions, the

securities industry has successfully attained many of the time and cost
advantages provided by arbitration. 16°
The arbitration of employment disputes in the securities
industry, however, has not been without its detractors. Notably,
scholars point out that the securities industry arbitration process was
not

designed

to

resolve

the

range

of

claims

it

currently

encompasses. 161 The initial purpose of securities arbitration was to
resolve commercial disputes between the industry and public
investors.162

This historical origin, along with the continued

prominence of investor-firm disputes, results in an arbitrator pool
that lacks experience in employment law. 63 For instance, neither the
NYSE nor the NASD assigns arbitrators to arbitration panels on the
164
basis of their knowledge of the subject matter of the dispute.
Consequently, an employment claim will likely be heard by

arbitrators whose expertise lies in complex securities matters, not
employment law. 65 This problem becomes especially acute when
The 1994 Government
discrimination claims are involved.

157. See ii.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
159. See, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991)
("Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration."); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1992); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303
(9th Cir. 1994) ("Our circuit has extended Gilmer to employment discrimination claims
brought under Title VII."); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d

1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994). But see Duffield v. Robertson Stevens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,
1199 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 establishes Congress'
intention to preclude the enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
Title VII claims).
160. See GAO REPORT, supra note 64, at 1.
161. See Dunphy, supra note 64, at 1172.
162. See i&
163. See GAO REPORT, supra note 64, at 11-12.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 9.
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Accounting Office report recognized that "[d]iscrimination suits are
inherently different from the usual types of employment disputes
arbitrated by SROs because they involved issues in federal civil rights
law that lie beyond the scope of securities law and industry
practices."' 66 Therefore, the report suggested that each arbitration
panel include at least one arbitrator with experience in employment
or discrimination law. 167 Another securities arbitration deficiency
involves the lack of arbitrator diversity. In terms of race, gender, and
age, securities arbitrators are far less diverse than the claimants who
seek resolution of discrimination disputes. 68 Employment arbitration
in the securities industry is further hindered by insufficient oversight.
The Securities and Exchange Commission focuses its arbitration
inspections on customer-firm disputes rather than employeremployee arbitrations. 169 Moreover, many of the general criticisms of

arbitration apply with similar force to the
mandatory employment
70
securities context.
Deficiencies in the securities arbitration process have led to a
gradual dissatisfaction with securities employment arbitration in both
the courts and in the industry itself. As noted in Part II, a district
court in Massachusetts found that the NYSE's arbitration system
inadequately protected the rights of employees.' 7 ' Likewise, two sex
discrimination suits were recently settled under terms which will alter
the use of binding arbitration for some securities employees. In one
case, the defendant securities firm, Smith Barney, Inc., agreed to
allow sexual harassment and discrimination plaintiffs to use outside
referees. 72 Under the proposed settlement, an outside mediator will
attempt to resolve the disputes and forward unresolved cases to a
three-member arbitration panel that includes at least one woman. 73
In a separate settlement, the brokerage firm Merrill Lynch
abandoned its policy of requiring employees to arbitrate employment
claims and will now allow claimants to bring suit in court regardless of
the language found in the securities industry's U-4 form. 74
166. Id. at 12.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id at 12.
170. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text; see also Dunphy, supra note 64, at
1201-02.
171. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
172. See Smith Barney Break With Wall St. in Settling Harassment Case, WASH. POST,

Nov. 19,1997, at C12.
173. See id.
174. See Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D.
Ill.
1997).
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These judicial developments, in conjunction with criticism of
employment arbitration, prompted the NASD to amend its U-4
arbitration provision. 175 In August 1997, the NASD eliminated the U4 provision that required securities dealers to arbitrate statutorily
based employment discrimination claims. 176 This change was
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 177 Similarly,
the NYSE proposed a similar rule change in 1998.178 However, these
changes do not forbid individual securities firms from including
mandatory arbitration agreements in their own employment
contracts. Firms that continue to insist on employment dispute
arbitration may become less attractive to potential employees, but the
perceived benefits of arbitration may still prompt firms to use
independent arbitration programs. Securities firms, like other
employers seeking to arbitrate employment claims, will have to
consider what substantive and procedural guarantees should be
included in their arbitration programs. Moreover, securities firms
also need to consider whether their arbitration system can withstand
an Engalla "fairness" analysis.
IV. Responding to the Engalla Decision
The Engalla decision poses a dilemma for employers seeking to
use arbitration for employment disputes: how should Engalla be
interpreted and applied by employers? At one extreme, the decision
is an indictment of the procedural problems associated with
employment arbitration systems and a warning that such systems will
not be upheld as a legitimate alternative to judicial resolution.
However, the EngallaCourt did not generally chastise arbitration as a
form of dispute resolution. Rather, the Court found fault with the
particular procedures used by Kaiser in its arbitration program.
Therefore, the crucial question is not whether arbitration is viable,
but what minimum set of procedural safeguards will enable a
particular arbitration system to withstand the judicial scrutiny of an
Engalla "fairness" analysis. Various alternatives are available to
guarantee the fair resolution of employment-disputes. An extreme
175. See Deborah Lohse, NASD Votes to End ArbitrationRules in Casesof Bias, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 8, 1997, at B14.
176. See id.
177. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.; Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims, 63 Fed. Reg. 35,299 (1998).
178. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes by
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Arbitration Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,782
(1998).
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solution would prohibit employment dispute arbitration. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, Engalla could be ignored as unhelpful
and inapplicable to future cases. Most commentators, however,
acknowledge the benefits of arbitration and therefore suggest various
changes to arbitration procedures rather than wholesale
abandonment. If implemented, such safeguards are likely to shield
employers from the potentially negative repercussions of the Engalla
decision.
As mentioned above, one possible response to the Engalla
decision is to disregard it. According to this view, the Court's analysis
was an interesting, but unimportant, aberration in arbitration
jurisprudence. Moreover, the unconventional "fairness" analysis
used by the California Court was prompted by the unique facts of the
case, and it will not be generally applied in future challenges to
mandatory arbitration agreements. Such a view is not outrageous.
Kaiser's self-administered arbitration program involved disturbing
patterns of delay and obstruction. 179 Moreover, Kaiser's practice of
delay resulted in the death of the misdiagnosed claimant before he
had an opportunity to challenge the treatment he received from
Kaiser doctors. Even the Engalla dissent acknowledged that the
"intended target of the majority's wrath... could not be more
deserving.' 180 The unique facts of Kaiser's arbitration program
offended the justices to such a degree that their examination of the
legal claims of waiver and fraud was guided by a factual
condemnation of Kaiser's arbitration process. The Court may not
have intended a "fairness" analysis of Kaiser's procedures; it may
have been merely a byproduct of the factual circumstances involved
in the case.
Nonetheless, even if this dismissive view controls, Engalla should
not be totally ignored. At a minimum, the decision provides a specific
example of how not to structure an arbitration system: (a) do not set
unrealistic timelines for arbitration proceedings if the system will
repeatedly fail to satisfy the time frames, and (b) do not make claims
of speed and efficiency if the arbitration program is consistently
unable to live up to such promises. These simple rules may be the
narrow lesson of Engalla, and the unconventional procedural scrutiny
employed in the decision might only be repeated when an arbitration
program is similarly outrageous. Nevertheless, in view of the
widespread criticism of employment dispute arbitration and the
sparse, but seemingly growing, collection of judicial scrutiny of
arbitration procedures, a passive response to the Engalla decision
179. See Engalla,938 P.2d at 908-14.
180. 938 P.2d at 927 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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would be a dangerous gamble for employers who wish to enjoy the
benefits of arbitration.
In direct opposition to the view that Engalla maintains the status
quo, some critics of employment arbitration contend that the Engalla
decision does not go far enough. Instead, these critics advocate the
complete prohibition of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nonunion employment contracts. This position has been taken up in both
federal and state legislatures. In 1994, the Coercive Employment
Agreements Act was proposed in the United States Senate. 81' This

bill would prohibit employers from requiring employees to agree to
82
arbitration as a condition of employment or job advancement.
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, the Civil Rights

Procedures Protection Act of 1994 attempted to amend federal civil
rights statutes.183 The bill sought to add language providing that the
statutes determined procedure for and retained exclusive power over
employment claims.Y4 In addition, the bill provided that arbitration
agreements could only be entered into after a dispute had arisen. 8 5

Other proposals in the United States Senate and House have similarly
called for amendments to federal civil rights statutes in order to

prevent the involuntary arbitration of claims arising from unlawful
employment discrimination. 186 However, none of the federal
proposals have passed.
California has witnessed similar attempts to prohibit
employment dispute arbitration.' 7 Meanwhile, several states have
gone beyond mere proposals and have enacted restrictions on
arbitration in the employment context. 8 For instance, some states
do not enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 189 Other state
181. See S. 2012; see also Ponte, supra note 123, at 360 n.4 (citing Hope B. Eastman &
David M. Rothenstein, The Fate of Mandatory Employment ArbitrationAmidst Growing
Opposition:A Callfor Common Ground,20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 595,601 (1995)).
182. See S. 2012.
183. H.R. 4981.
184. See Ponte, supra note 123, at 360 n.4.
185. See id.
186. See S. 63, 105th Congress (January 21, 1997); H.R. 3748, 104th Congress (1996);
H.R. 983, 105th Congress (March 6,1997).
187. See Cal. A.B. 574, Cal. Reg. Sess. (February 25, 1997) (intending to prohibit predispute arbitration agreements between employees and employers); Cal. S.B. 19, Reg.
Sess. (December 2, 1996) (proposing to amend the California Code of Civil Procedure to
require that courts vacate arbitration awards if a standardized contract, drafted by a nonconsumer party, contains a mandatory arbitration provision which binds a consumer party
(a consumer is defined as an employee pursuing an employment dispute)).
188. See Grodin, supra note 68, at 18 nn.103-13 (listing the various state statutes which
limit the enforceability of arbitration).
189. See ALA. CODE § 6-6-1 (Michie Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658-2 (1993);
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statutes specifically prohibit the enforcement of arbitration
agreements in employment contracts. 19°
In the judicial realm, only the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has held that mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes are unenforceable. 191 In Duffield v. Robertson
Stevens & Co., the Ninth Circuit found that the text, legislative
history, and purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended
Title VII, evinced the congressional intent to preclude the waiver of
the judicial forum for Title VII discrimination claims. 192
Prohibiting mandatory employment arbitration offers an
appealing solution to critics of unfair arbitration procedures. An
absolute prohibition immediately eliminates the unease associated
with a private arbitrator applying public discrimination laws since an
employee could pursue statutory claims in court. As illustrated by
legislative proposals and the Duffield decision, some commentators
feel that employment discrimination statutes were intended to be
interpreted and applied by courts of law. Nonetheless, such an
extreme response to the perceived flaws of arbitration reintroduces
many of the problems arbitration was devised to avoid. For instance,
the absence of arbitration would further clog the courts with
employment dispute lawsuits. In addition, employees and employers
would be saddled with the slow, cumbersome, and expensive
attributes of the trial system.
In light of these concerns, many observers propose a compromise
between the above described extremes. According to this view,
mandatory arbitration of employment disputes should be permitted
(or even favored) so long as procedural safeguards are included to
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-15-101 (Law Co-op 1972 & Supp. 1995); VA. CODE § 55-10-1
(1990).
190. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1517 (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §
679A.l(2)(b) (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN, sec. 5-401(c)(2) (1986); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. sec. 417.050 (Michie 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.700 (Michie 1995); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. 9:4216 (West 1991); MD. ANN. CODE § 34-206(b) (Michie 1989 & Supp.
1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435-350 (West
1992). Although these statutes are impressive as an indication of legislative trends, they
have limited practical effect due to the preemptive force of the Federal Arbitration Act,
which has been interpreted to cover general employment contracts. See Grodin, supra
note 68, at 18. See also Grodin, supra note 68, at 15-20, for a discussion of the conflicting
interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act's § 1 exemption for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. §1 (West 1997). Most lower courts have found
that §1 does not exempt the majority of employment contracts. See Malin, supra note 60,
at 88-91; Buse, supranote 57, at 1503-05 & n.126.
191. See Duffield v. Robertson Stevens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,1199 (9th Cir. 1998).
19Z See idL
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ensure the fairness of such an arrangement. In the wake of the
Engalla Court's careful scrutiny of Kaiser's arbitration procedures,
adding procedural safeguards to mandatory arbitration systems
appears to be the surest way to guarantee that a particular arbitration
system will survive judicial review. The question that remains,
however, is what minimum set of procedural safeguards will pass
muster under a "fairness" analysis. 9 3
The Engalladecision itself offers the first clue towards answering
this question. Part of the Court's criticism of Kaiser's arbitration
program was that Kaiser acted as administrator for its own
program. 9 4 The majority noted that "many large institutional users
of arbitration, including most health maintenance organizations
(HMO's), avoid potential problems of delay in the selection of
arbitrators by contracting with neutral third party organizations, such
as the American Arbitration Association (AAA)."'95 The Court's
statement indicates that contracting with an outside arbitration
agency will counter a presumption of unfairness that is associated
with an employer-administered arbitration processes. One reason
neutral organizations counter any perceived unfairness is that many
have adopted special arbitration rules that provide for claimant
representation, discovery as deemed necessary by the arbitrator, and
written opinions. 196 Moreover, users of the AAA are required to
abide by these immutable procedural guidelines.'9
Kaiser Permanente, meanwhile, has taken the Engalla Court's
suggestions to heart. In January 1998, Kaiser announced that it was
adopting a set of major changes to its malpractice arbitration system,
The accepted
as proposed by an independent panel. 98
an
independent
the
creation
of
recommendations included
administrator to manage Kaiser's system, procedures to speed up its

193. A 1997 study revealed that existing arbitration systems are remarkably diverse and
contain varying levels of procedural safeguards. Meanwhile, several companies in the
study have not yet instituted an arbitration system for employment disputes but remain
interested in doing so; they are waiting to see what type and what level of safeguards will
be required by the courts before proceeding. See Bickner et al., supranote 58, at 82.
194. See Engalla,938 P.2d at 922.
195. 1& at 918.
196. See idl.
at n.9 (citing AMERICAN ARBrrRATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES (INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES)
(1993)). The AAA has also published a guide to assist employers in creating internal
dispute resolution procedures: AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, RESOLVING
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: A MANUAL ON DRAFrING PROCEDURES (1993).

197. See Engalla,938 P.2d at 918 n.9.
198. See Harriet Chiang, Kaiser to Revamp Arbitration System, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 7,
1998, at A15.
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process, and regular audits and evaluations of the process. 99
In addition, two organized efforts have attempted to outline the
procedural protections required for a fair arbitration proceeding: the
Dunlop Commission Report 2°° issued by the United States
Departments of Commerce and Labor and the Due Process Protocol
for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of
the Employment Relationship. 201
The Dunlop Commission
encouraged the use of private arbitration for workplace disputes but
202
also recognized the need for standards to govern such procedures.
The Commission identified several essential features of an acceptable
plan, including: a neutral arbitrator who knows the law; employee
access to information for presenting a claim; cost sharing; the right to
representation; remedies equal to those available through litigation;
reasoned, written opinions; and judicial review of decisions to ensure
consistency with the law.20 3 The Due Process Protocol, composed of
representatives of the American Bar Association and several private
ADR organizations, also recommended certain procedural
safeguards. 204 The Protocol found that representation, adequate
discovery, written decisions, and remedies equal to those available in
court were essential standards for arbitration agreements. 205
Although these reports are merely advisory and not binding on
courts, they provide insight into what experts consider to be the
minimum procedural safeguards necessary for arbitration.
Scholarly examinations of employment arbitration also offer a
plethora of suggested procedural requirements. One recurring
demand is that employment disputes be heard by arbitrators who
have sufficient experience with employment law.206 Moreover, it is
suggested that arbitrators be chosen from a pool of sexually and racial
diverse individuals who reflect workplace demographics. 207 Many
commentators also propose changes in how arbitrators are selected in
199. See iL

200. See Report

AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

WORKER-MANAGEMENT

COMMISSION

ON THE FUTURE OF

RELATIONS (December 1994) [hereinafter REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS].

201. See Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employmen4 A Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the
Employment Relationship,DISP. RESOL J. Oct-Dec. 1995, at 37 [hereinafter Task Force].
202. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 200, at 30-31.
203. See id. See also Bickner et al., supra note 58, at 12.
204. See Task Force,supra note 201.
205. See icL
206. See Buse, supra note 57, at 1532-33; Dunphy, supra note 64, at 1213-14; GAO
REPORT, supra note 64, at 12.
207. See Ponte, supra note 123, at 385-86; Dunphy, supra note 64, at 1214. See also
GAO REPORT, supra note 64, at 12.
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specific disputes. For instance, fears regarding the fairness of an
arbitration process are reduced where employees are given an equal
voice in selecting an arbitrator. 208 A related suggestion would allow
employees to challenge arbitrators through a "certain number of
In
preemptory challenges and unlimited challenges for cause." 2
1997, the Chief of the National Labor Relations Board, William
Gould, offered similar recommendations to ensure the impartiality of
arbitration, including the use of diverse arbitrators who have
expertise in employment discrimination, the sharing of arbitration
costs between employers and employees, and giving employees a
voice in selecting arbitrators. 210
The fairness of employment arbitration would also be
strengthened by taking several steps at the time when an employee
initially agrees to an arbitration provision. For instance, employers
should clearly and specifically explain what disputes are covered by
their arbitration provision and what rights are waived by agreeing to
arbitrate, such as the right to appeal, the right to extensive discovery,
and the right to a jury.21' Similarly, commentators advise that
employees be adequately educated regarding the benefits and
disadvantages of arbitration212 and be provided with clear,
of arbitration,
understandable notice of the meaning and scope
213
perhaps through a separate acknowledgment form.
Adjustments to arbitration hearings themselves might also help
guarantee the fairness of employment arbitration. Most importantly,
214
employees should be given a right to representation by counsel.
Flexible discovery, as deemed necessary by the arbitrator in a
particular dispute, could also reinforce the legitimacy of employment
arbitration decisions. 215 Furthermore, in order to maintain the
integrity of federal employment statutes, the procedures outlined in
Title VII and other such statutes should be followed in arbitration
proceedings. 216 The publication of reasoned, written opinions has
208. See Grodin, supra note 68, at 43-44; Malin, supra note 60, at 98; Ponte, supra note
123, at 385-86; Buse, supra note 57, at 1532; Dunphy, supra note 64, at 1214.
209. Ponte, supra note 123, at 386.
210. See Ilana DeBare, NLRB Chief Backs Rules for Arbitration,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10,

1997, at C1.
211. See Buse, supra note 57, at 1519-22, and cf. Hoffman, supra note 77, at 156;
Howard, supranote 67, at 283; Ponte, supranote 123, at 385.
212. See Ponte, supranote 123, at 385.
213. See Buse, supra note 57, at 1526.
214. See Grodin, supranote 68, at 45; Malin, supranote 60, at 98.
215. See Oakley & Mayer, supra note 72, at 532; Buse, supra note 57, at 1534-35;
Dunphy, supranote 64, at 1215.
216. See Ponte, supra note 123, at 385. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

also been recommended in order to ensure the fairness of
employment arbitration. 217 Finally, several writers propose enhanced
judicial review of employment arbitration decisions.218 This last
proposal seeks to ensure that arbitrators will properly apply the
substantive law of employment statutes.
Despite their commendable appeals to general notions of
fairness, the above proposals raise several problems. Providing for
increased discovery and heightened judicial review makes arbitration
look more like the trial system that it is intended to replace. Such
alterations may diminish the speed, efficiency, inexpensiveness, and
finality that arbitration was designed to provide. Another problem
with "fairness" proposals is that it will be extremely difficult for
courts to police arbitration systems for "fairness." Unlike Engalla,
where Kaiser's system was uniquely unsettling, a closer case may lead
to decisions based on the subjective notions of fairness held by a
particular judge. Employers would be helpless in trying to determine
what type of arbitration system will pass judicial muster. Therefore,
adopting meaningful and enforceable standards for arbitrator
selection and discovery may be a task best left to legislatures or
219
administrative agencies.
Proponents of these procedural changes argue, however, that any
negative effects will be negligible or will be outweighed by the
benefits they create. For example, judicial review of employment
arbitration decisions could be limited to ensuring arbitrator
adherence to statutory prerogatives; courts would give broad
deference to arbitrator fact findings while conducting de novo review
of an arbitrator's legal conclusions.220
Meanwhile, increased
discovery rights may leave employees more amenable to the
arbitration system and less distrustful of mandatory arbitration
221
clauses.

statute; it only submits
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
217. See Grodin, supra note 68, at 47; Oakley & Mayer, supra note 72, at 533; Buse,
supra note 57, at 1537; Dunphy, supra note 64, at 1215.
218. See Grodin, supra note 68, at 46-47; Malin, supra note 60, at 104-05; Malin &
Ladenson, supra note 56, at 1237-38; Buse, supra note 57, at 1537-38; Dunphy, supra note
51, at 1215; Oakley & Mayer, supra note 72, at 533-34.
219. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 685, at 52-53.
220. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 56, at 1238.
221. See Buse, supra note 57, at 1535.
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
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V. Withstanding Engalla's Procedural "Fairness" Standard: A
Proposal
Despite the difficulties that will accompany an increase in
arbitration's procedural protections, some measure of procedural
safeguards should be adopted in the employment arbitration context.
Procedural protections will help reduce the unease that many
commentators have with employment arbitrators deciding important
questions of statutory law. Moreover, an increase in procedural
safeguards represents a desirable compromise between the
unfavorable extremes of either leaving arbitration alone, and thereby
risking the nonenforcement of "unfair" systems, or outlawing
employment dispute arbitration entirely.
Finally, and most
importantly, an employment arbitration system that includes
procedural safeguards will withstand judicial scrutiny under a
"fairness" standard and thus avoid the refusal to compel arbitration
that occurred in Engalla.
Therefore, this Note proposes that all employment arbitration
proceedings include the following features. First, employees should
never be solely responsible for paying the costs and fees of an
2 Instead, as suggested by JAMS/Endispute,
arbitration proceeding. m
a national arbitration services organization, arbitration procedures
should allocate costs in a way that does not preclude access by the
employee to the procedures.223 In some situations, an employer
should offer to pay all arbitration costs. This would be advisable
where the employer unilaterally drafts the employment contract and
offers it to employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Nevertheless,
since a perception of arbitrator partiality could arise where the
employer alone pays all arbitration costs and fees, employees should
always be given the opportunity to pay an equal share.224 In
situations where an arbitration agreement is the product of armslength negotiations between the employer and employee, the equal
sharing of arbitration costs and fees will be appropriate. Arbitration
agreements are contractual arrangements; thus, if the parties to the
contract agree to split the costs and fees of arbitration, their wishes
should be respected. As long as costs and fees are shared equally, any
procedural unfairness regarding arbitration costs and fees is
222. In Cole v. Burns Int'l Sea Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the D.C.
Circuit held that an employer cannot require an employee to pay all or part of an
arbitrator's fee.
223. See JAMS/ENDIsPUTE, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS,
POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

(1998)

(encouraging any company that

implements mandatory arbitration to adopt various arbitration procedures).
224. See icL

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

sufficiently reduced.
Second, arbitration procedures should ensure a minimum level of
discovery. Discovery ordinarily should not be as broad as it would be
in litigation or else the advantages of speed and efficiency potentially
available from arbitration will be destroyed. However, every
arbitration must at least permit the discovery necessary for full and
adequate consideration of the employment claims in a particular
dispute. Thus, at a minimum, employees should have the right to
document exchange and the deposition of the supervisor or other
decision-maker responsible for the adverse employment action.M
Likewise, employers should be entitled to documents and the
deposition of the employee. 226 In many cases, an abbreviated level of
discovery will sufficiently inform an arbitrator as to the parties
contentions. However, complex or unusual cases may require
extensive discovery and this should not be curtailed for the sake of
rushing a dispute to conclusion.
Third, arbitration must be conducted by a neutral, impartial
arbitrator who is mutually selected by both parties. A relatively
straightforward way to ensure impartiality is to contract with an
outside arbitration agency for the appointment of arbitrators. This
will counter any presumption of unfairness that is naturally associated
with an arbitration process administered exclusively by one party.
Moreover, employment dispute arbitrators should have some
experience or familiarity with employment law as well as the statutes
that affect the workplace.
Fourth, employment arbitrators should not be restricted in the
remedies they may award. Instead, arbitrators should have the
authority to grant whatever relief is available in court under law or
equity. Full access to remedies ensures that participants possess the
same rights and opportunities to relief that they would have in court.
Fifth, arbitration decisions should be accompanied by wellreasoned, written opinions. This requirement may reduce the risk
that an arbitration decision will be vacated by a reviewing court. In a
recent Second Circuit case, Halliganv. PiperJaffey, Inc., 7 the court
held that when arbitrators do not explain the rationale for their
award, the arbitration decision may be vacated if it appears not to
8
conform with the evidence presented at the arbitration proceeding.2
225. See id.
226. See iL
227. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
228. See Ruth V. Glick, Write It Down: Lack of Reasoned Opinion Supports Vacating
Award, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 28, 1998, at 5. Also, without a written award that explains the
legal basis for the arbitrator's decision, a reviewing court will have nothing to counter the
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Although the above suggestions require employment arbitration
hearings to include various procedural protections, the suggestions,
by their nature, also exclude certain safeguards. For example, a jury
is not essential for arbitration proceedings. Agreeing to arbitrate
carries with it the understanding that a dispute will be considered by
an arbitrator (or arbitrators) and not by the judge and jury associated
with courtroom proceedings. The relinquishment of a jury as
decision-maker reflects a trade-off designed to ensure the efficiency
and speed offered by arbitration. On average, the presence of a jury
complicates and thereby prolongs a proceeding. Arbitration is
intended to avoid this result. Consequently, a court will not find that
the absence of a jury renders an arbitration proceeding "unfair."
Similarly, extensive discovery is not required.
Although
extensive discovery may sometimes be necessary in arbitration,
arbitrators should attempt to limit discovery to levels
are
minimally necessary for the arbitrator to reach an informed that
decision.
Thus, material evidence must be discoverable and admissible.
However, arbitration should not degenerate into the discovery
gamesmanship that sometimes obstructs courtroom litigation.
Finally, judicial review of the merits of arbitration need not be
expanded. As discussed earlier, most courts currently limit review of
arbitration to issues of contract formation, the arbitrability of
particular disputes, or outright arbitrator misconduct. 229 Great
deference is given to an arbitrator's legal and factual conclusions
regarding the merits of a dispute. This practice provides finality to
arbitration participants because they know that the time-consuming
appeals that often accompany courtroom litigation are rare in the
arbitration context. The addition of procedural safeguards to the
arbitration process should not alter the limited scope of judicial
review. The examination of arbitration processes should be strictly
limited to a review of arbitration procedures. Thus, when asked to
review the merits of a decision, courts can continue to give great
deference to arbitrator decisions.
charge that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. In contrast, when reviewing
courts have a reasoned, written record to examine, they will be able to clearly see how an
arbitrator applied the governing law and, more significantly, in most cases courts will
confine their review to the limited grounds set forth in federal and state statutes. See 9
U.S.C. § 10 (West 1997); see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1997) (providing
grounds for vacating an arbitration award which are similar to those found in the federal
statute); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (West 1997) (vacation of arbitration award due
to arbitrator's failure to make required disclosures); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1286.6
(West 1997) (correction of arbitration award). Under these narrow statutory grounds for
review, courts are unlikely to vacate arbitral decisions except in unusual circumstances.
229. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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The above suggestions pose a risk that employment arbitration
will become more like litigation. However, the importance of the
statutory and common law rights at stake in employment disputes
makes this risk worthwhile. Moreover, procedural protection may
reduce the unease employees have in being subjected to arbitration
and ensure both parties' willingness to submit employment disputes
to arbitration. Most importantly, by adopting the procedural
protections described above, an employment arbitration system will
be able to survive the "fairness" analysis of Engalla v. Kaiser
Permanente.
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court's Engalladecision portends a new
direction in the judicial analysis of arbitration clauses. The
arbitration procedures called for by mandatory arbitration clauses in
the non-commercial context, particularly the employment context,
may be subjected to a searching "fairness" scrutiny in future cases.
Several other courts have taken a similar approach to arbitration
systems and in combination with Engalla these decisions may
represent a growing dissatisfaction with the alleged inequities of
binding arbitration agreements. Nevertheless, the basic legitimacy of
arbitration remains intact. Courts may continue to limit arbitration
review to the contractual formation of arbitration agreements and the
arbitrability of disputes under particular arbitration clauses.
Moreover, particular courts may refuse to inquire into the procedures
used by arbitration programs.
The question of whether Engalla represents the forefront of a
new trend or a judicial anomaly, however, is of only secondary
importance. The true significance of the decision is the risk it
presents to employers who rely on arbitration clauses and the
opportunity it offers to employees who seek to challenge binding
arbitration. In the wake of Engalla, an employer who adopts or
continues to apply an arbitration system which lacks minimum
procedural protections may encounter intense judicial scrutiny of
their arbitration process and risk a judicial finding that their
arbitration procedures are "unfair." Like Kaiser, employers who use
such a system will be deprived of arbitration's benefits. Meanwhile,
employees who substantiate their unfairness claims will be able to
successfully challenge binding arbitration clauses and thereby avoid
arbitration's restraints.
The specific nature and amount of procedural protections
required to withstand a "fairness" scrutiny remains unsettled. Courts
and commentators suggest a wide variety of possible changes to
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arbitration procedures, but no magic formula guarantees the
enforceability of a particular system. Nonetheless, the Engalla
decision has made it clear that some level of procedural safeguards
should be included in arbitration programs. In the absence of
procedural protections, employers take an unjustifiable risk that their
arbitration system will be found unfair, and thus, unenforceable.

